The exercise of moral imagination in stigmatized work groups by Roca, Esther
The Exercise of Moral Imagination
in Stigmatized Work Groups Esther Roca
ABSTRACT. This study introduces the concept of moral
imagination in a work context to provide an ethical
approach to the controversial relationships between dirty
work and dirty workers. Moral imagination is assessed as
an essential faculty to overcome the stigma associated with
dirty work and facilitate the daily work lives of workers.
The exercise of moral imagination helps dirty workers to
face the moral conflicts inherent in their tasks and to build
a personal stance toward their occupation. Finally, we
argue that organizations with dirty work groups should
actively adopt measures to encourage their employees’
exercise of moral imagination. This study investigates how
organizations might create conditions that inspire moral
imagination, particularly with regard to the importance of
organizational culture as a means to enhance workers’
moral sensitivity. Furthermore, this investigation analyzes
different company practices that may derive from a culture
committed to moral imagination.
KEY WORDS: moral imagination, dirty work, moral
conflicts, stigma, work groups
Introduction
I think some [parents] are disappointed when you say
you’re going into psychiatric nursing. (cited in Wells
et al., 2000, p. 84)
Negative and stigmatizing assessments regarding
mental health nursing discredit the valuable contri
butions of mental health nurses; but more impor
tantly, these beliefs discount the needs of people
who require access to mental health care. Oermann
and Sperling (1999) observe that, unfortunately,
recruitment of psychiatric practitioners is not keep
ing pace with the growing need among the mentally
ill, perhaps because of its negative societal rejection.
In general, society censures certain occupations or
the methods employed in their exercise; moral
controversy generated by such jobs triggers a stigma
for their practitioners. These controversial occupa
tions, including mental health jobs, provoke ques
tions about their legitimacy and aggressive reactions
from some members of society. For various reasons,
seemingly very different professions, such as grave
diggers or exotic dancers, require their practitioners
to defend their career choices.
Hughes (1951) refers to these very diverse and
stigmatized occupations as ‘‘dirty work,’’ a term he
defines as occupations likely to be perceived as dis
gusting or degrading by wider society. The definition
includes all tasks that seem physically, psychologically,
or morally tainted, because society views the specific
characteristics of those jobs, as well as the contro
versies that often surround them, as reasons to devalue
such occupations. The resulting social rejection may
affect the self perception of people who work in these
jobs.
Social science research on stigmatization has
grown significantly in the past three decades, par
ticularly in social psychology realms. The roles that
people play at work and the groups and organiza
tions with which they affiliate offer potentially
powerful sources of stigmatization, according to
social psychologists, sociologists, and organizational
theorists (Goffman, 1963; Link and Phelan, 2001;
Paetzold et al., 2008). Much research relies on eth
nographic and organizational identity findings that
indicate that dirty workers are acutely aware of the
stigma associated with their occupations (Bolton,
2005; Tracy, 2004). In turn, they have studied the
ambivalent stance toward their work that many dirty
workers adopt, and propose diverse solutions to
transform its meaning and mitigate the impact of the
pervasive stigmas on their identity (Ashforth and
Kreiner, 1999). In general, these workers seek to
build a personal response and stance toward their

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jobs that will enable them to protect their identity –
not an easy task in some cases.
Scholars also note the harmful effects of stigma
tization on organizations and their members, as well
as on society in general. Stigmatized work groups
suffer discrimination and social refusal, which harms
workers’ identity, self perception, and subsequent
work performance. As prior studies show, the effects
also emerge as organizational dysfunctions, such as
high employee turnover and poor performance. In
addition, these conflicts might affect general social
welfare, because many dirty jobs are essential, such as
psychiatric nurses and hospital cleaning staff (Dutton
et al., 1996). Paradoxically, society seems to stig
matize occupations that it needs urgently and even
sometimes recognizes as heroic [e.g., social services
counseling, acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) advocates]. ‘‘Dirty’’ work groups may even
be marginalized by ‘‘clean’’ work groups in the same
company, which generates internal conflicts that will
clearly harm performance.
In this investigation, we defend the exercise of
moral imagination as crucial for a dual task by which
dirty workers construct a personal stance toward
their jobs and also confront the moral dilemmas
inherent in their daily work. Thus, we propose
moral imagination as a means to understand the
moral conflicts that emerge for stigmatized occupa
tions, as well as consider how it might help workers
face these conflicts.
Specifically, this article attempts to answer the
following questions: Why do dirty workers need
enhanced moral imagination? Can moral imagina
tion help dirty workers face morally ambiguous sit
uations? What role might moral imagination play in
overcoming the stigma associated with dirty occu
pations? Finally, should organizations with stigma
tized work groups actively work to encourage their
employees’ moral imagination? By answering these
questions, this research contributes to several streams
of business ethics and organizational literature.
In particular, the concept of moral imagination
traditionally appears in the field of business ethics to
describe ethical decision making processes (Hartman
et al., 2006; Moberg and Seabright, 2000; Seabright
and Schminke, 2002; Werhane, 1999). We instead
use this concept for a more specific, unique purpose.
Moral imagination in prior research is applied in a
business context and relates to other organizational
issues, such as organizational culture (Caldwell and
Moberg, 2006); however, no prior study assesses its
role to facilitate dirty workers’ daily work and over
come the stigma they face. We show that moral
imagination can play this crucial role by facilitating
coherent decision making processes, as well as sug
gesting creative solutions to situations that are morally
ambiguous according to our values. Because moral
imagination supports moral decision making, it also
might help socially dirty workers to face the constant
moral conflicts that emerge during their daily work.
Thus, we conclude that companies with dirty work
groups should adopt measures to promote their
employees’ exercise of moral imagination.
The peculiar nature and stigma of dirty work, as
well as the need to reconsider some aspects of
managing these occupations, also represent frequent
subjects in ethnographic and organizational identity
literature (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999; Ashforth
et al., 2007; Dick, 2005). These studies analyze dirty
work as a social construction and offer ideological
techniques and social practices that might enable
workers to achieve social affirmation. Without
neglecting the important contributions of these
studies, we move our analysis toward an ethical
perspective. That is, by applying moral imagination
to stigmatized occupations, we introduce an ethical
dimension to a problem that traditionally has been
treated as a psychological or social issue, especially in
organizational identity literature. We attempt to
show that stigmas attached to dirty work may be
engendered by others’ ethical views, so overcoming
them will require an ethical attitude, as provided by
moral imagination. The development of dirty
workers’ moral imagination may be a prerequisite
for implementing techniques proposed by organi
zational identity scholars; it also adds a personal
dimension to their application.
The remainder of this article is organized as fol
lows. First, we introduce three relevant roles played
by moral imagination in moral decision making in
the workplace. We consistently refer to these moral
imagination facets throughout this article to analyze
dirty occupations. Second, we explain the conflicts
and controversies that such occupations generate, as
well as our focus on socially dirty work, rather than
physically or morally dirty work. Third, we explain
the role that moral imagination can play in dirty
workers’ moral dilemmas. Fourth, we explain how
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social subgroups emerge to support the stigmatized
worker in dealing with externally unfavorable
assessments and complex decisions. Fifth and finally,
we reflect on some organizational implications and
discuss different organizational practices that may
promote the exercise of members’ moral imagination.
Moral imagination in the workplace
More than a decade has passed since Werhane (1998)
introduced the concept of moral imagination to the
field of business ethics. Collier (2006, p. 312) explains
that the presence of imagination in moral judgments
‘‘is associated with the move to pragmatism in epis
temology and with the shift to classical Aristotelian
ism in ethics.’’ This concept, derived from
philosophy (Nussbaum, 1990; Tivnan, 1995), has
been subject to varied treatments by organizational
scholars, especially in the field of business ethics (e.g.,
Caldwell and Moberg, 2006; Collier, 2006; Hartman
et al. 2006; Moberg and Seabright, 2000; Seabright
and Schminke, 2002; Werhane, 1999), in an effort to
acquire better understanding of the moral decision
making process. Unfortunately, moral imagination
lacks a common and succinct definition (Jacobs,
1991; Johnson, 1993). The most common concep
tualization categorizes it as a faculty that plays an
important role in moral decision making by helping
people to grasp the moral quality of a situation and
facilitating linked decisions. In general, moral imag
ination emerges as an overriding sense that enables
people to recognize the context and personal cir
cumstances of their decisions, create images of the
future to illuminate the present, and develop critical
self reflections about their potential as moral crea
tures. Intuitively, it appears to refer to the emotional
and critical components of moral deliberation and
also has been related to the concept of practical
wisdom (Roca, 2007).
In line with Werhane, Caldwell and Moberg
(2006) note three relevant roles played by moral
imagination in moral decision making in the work
place. This perspective is coherent with Rest’s model
of ethical decision making as employed by Moberg
and Seabright (2000) to clarify the significance of
moral imagination. Later, we analyze how these
concrete aspects of moral imagination may be par
ticularly relevant for our analysis of dirty occupations.
Moral intuition
Moral imagination initiates imaginative moral intu
ition that recognizes the moral content of a given
situation, even if it is not easily evident, and crea
tively envisions its potential repercussions. In moral
situations, imagination expands and evokes more
facets, which generate additional possible actions and
scenarios. Moral imagination also contributes to the
elaboration of a wider moral awareness of a situation
or dilemma, which helps the worker create potential
courses of personal action.
This moral intuition generally appears as a double
awareness. First, it provides a broader perception of
the underlying ethical issues and repercussions of any
action or attitude adopted toward a conflict laden
situation. Second, it implies a more complete per
ception of diverse perspectives that includes the
person’s own and others’ feelings and values. In the
empathetic process of perspective taking, that is,
taking the perspective of others involved in the
decision context (Piaget, 1932), moral imagination
activates a deep sensitivity about the person’s own
feelings and prospects, as well as those of others. On
the one hand, the process by which others’ perspec
tive becomes one’s own should make the person
more empathic toward stigmatized groups (Sheehan
et al., 1989). On the other hand, and as we discuss in
the next section, wider perception and awareness of
one’s own feelings and virtues seem crucial to make
decisions that are coherent with personal values. The
empathic facet of moral imagination thus makes a
person more open minded, which may mean more
critical but also more tolerant. Both properties are
essential for consolidating a positive relationship
between the self and the dirty job, as well as to
understand the challenges that dirty work groups face.
Moral judgment, principles, and values
Moral imagination helps moral reasoning, which
enables moral judgments, but it is important to
differentiate these elements. Moral imagination is
not the same as moral reasoning; rather, it acts on
moral deliberation as its emotional facet. As Werh
ane (1999) explains, ‘‘moral imagination is an
affective facilitating process that influences, but is
not identical, to moral reasoning.’’ Rational and
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emotional elements join together in moral deliber
ation, and moral imagination illuminates them to
create a more complete, critical, and personal sce
nario. Various research fields investigate the promi
nence of and roles played by both emotional and
rational elements in moral deliberation; for example,
in philosophy and sociology, scholars study the
rational and emotional weight of practical wisdom,
which derives from the consideration of human
beings as creatures of reason and feeling (see the
special issue of Social Epistemology; McKenna et al.,
2007). They assert that the exercise of practical
wisdom can articulate knowledge by integrating
values and emotions. Other scholars, using Blasi’s
(1980) and Kohlberg’s (1969) work, emphasize the
rational factors and argue that intelligence is a causal
factor of good moral reasoning and behavior. Still
other scholars develop diverse views of how imagi
nation and the emotional facet of practical wisdom
might influence moral decision making (Alexander,
1993; Fesmier, 1999; Johnson, 1993; Kekes, 1991;
Larmore, 1981; McCullough, 1991; Roca, 2008;
Tivnan, 1995; Werhane, 1999; Williams, 1997).
In general, we assert that moral imagination acti
vates both affective and rational responses during
ethical reflections and contributes to moral delibera
tion by providing more critical and coherent decision
processes in two aspects. First, during moral judg
ment, moral imagination provides the critical ability
and flexibility to use moral criteria, and the intuition
needed for moral judgment. Second, it reminds the
person of his or her own moral values and principles
and thus activates diverse moral selves (Markus and
Nurius, 1986) and images of the self who we want to
be as a moral person (Schwalbe, 1991). Moral imag
ination helps people disclose their own moral values
and make coherent decisions. This aspect is crucial
with regard to the dilemmas faced by dirty workers. In
general, more complete awareness should favor the
generation of different actions and the adoption of a
stance consistent with the person’s moral values.
Therefore, moral imagination helps people make
decisions that align with their own moral identity.
Critical creativity
Finally, the creative facet of moral imagination
pushes moral evaluation into a rich reevaluation,
beyond traditional deliberation and scenarios. The
imaginative and critical exploration of possibilities
and consequences enhances disengagement from the
self and the immediate context to envision more
innovative ones. As we explain subsequently, this
ability should be crucial to dirty workers in their
efforts to disengage from the ‘‘dirt’’ and explore
unconventional approaches, as are often required by
their unconventional jobs. These workers are also
consistently exposed to complex moral conflicts
regarding the appropriate means to employ. Moral
imagination can offer richer and innovative ways to
face these unconventional and complex dilemmas.
Dirty work–dirty worker relationships
As we mentioned previously, the concept of dirty
work was originally invoked by Everett Hughes to
refer to occupational activities likely to be perceived
as physically, socially, or morally disgusting or
degrading. This definition embraces an extensive
variety of tasks and any occupation that seems in
some way tainted. Following Hughes’s (1951) con
ceptualization, we consider a refuse collector, a
psychiatric nurse, and a pawnbroker as exemplars of
diverse types of these dirty occupations.
Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) also analyze various
conflicts that these tasks generate for their subjects
and explain how workers might respond to the taint
of their jobs. Many dirty workers adopt an ambiv
alent stance toward their jobs; they also face diffi
culties in attempting to build a positive sense of
identity, because their sense of self tends to be
grounded in their roles and relies on others’ positive
affirmation (Albert et al., 2000; Ashforth, 2001;
Pratt, 1998). In general, organizational identity re
search observes that societal rejection directly affects
the sense of self in the workplace and demands
sociological–psychological solutions.
Workers’ low self esteem, due to their occupa
tions, likely becomes manifest at different levels.
From an organizational perspective, workers’ low
consideration of their own work may induce high
turnover or low productivity. At a more global level,
it results in a paradox. In some cases, the same
workers who provoke repugnance in society are
those most urgently needed to enable society to
survive. As we consider subsequently, most dirty
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jobs are desperately required from a social point of
view, such as janitors, gravediggers, or police officers
(Hughes, 1962), though not all of them are. How
ever, people still avoid contact with these groups,
even those whose work they applaud; the stigmati
zation results precisely from the distance they
attempt to maintain. However, in several cases the
stigma may be due to ethically substantial conflicts,
so overcoming it demands an ethical response, as
provided by moral imagination.
At this point of our analysis, we distinguish the
three types of dirty work invoked by Hughes (1951)
and identify those that are more significant for our
study, that is, those for which workers’ moral
imagination might play a more relevant role.
Physical, social, and moral taint
Consistent with Hughes’s (1951) definition, Ashforth
and Kreiner (1999) establish that, in a physically
dirty occupation, workers deal directly with some
disgusting material (e.g., janitors, exterminators,
gravediggers); in contrast, ‘‘an occupation is socially
tainted when [it] involves regular contact with peo
ple or groups that are themselves regarded as stig
matized’’ (e.g., AIDS worker, psychiatric assistant,
police officer) (Dick, 2005). Finally, occupations are
tainted morally if they are regarded as somewhat
sinful or of dubious virtue (e.g., pawnbroker, casino
croupier, stripper). Dirty work also may be tainted on
several dimensions, such as a gravedigger, who seems
tainted on both the social and the physical dimen
sions, though one of these dimensions likely has
greater weight in defining the occupation as dirty.
Furthermore, the differences associated with these
tainted occupations not only are taxonomical but also
demand different treatments.
Previous work often considers the influence of
occupational prestige on such tasks. In this sense,
prestige may mitigate or enhance the taint associated
with some occupations (Treiman, 1977). This effect
is especially strong for occupations that are not
affected by moral controversies. Compare, for
example, the social perception of a physically dirty
profession, such as a dentist or surgeon, with that of a
janitor. However, the prestige effect appears less
significant for socially or morally dirty occupations,
such that people’s perceptions of a tattoo designer
and the owner of the tattoo shop are likely sub
stantially the same. Prestige also cannot mitigate the
taint of working for a tobacco company, regardless
of the person’s position in the company. The effect
may even be opposite, such that the chief executive
officer (CEO) of a tobacco company, who gains
riches by endangering others’ health, might be per
ceived even more negatively than a blue collar
worker employed by the same company. In general,
we can assert that socially and morally dirty occu
pations are less affected by occupational prestige than
are physically dirty ones.
Because moral imagination is a helpful mechanism
for dealing with morally ambiguous decision
making processes, we posit that its impact on phys
ically dirty work lacks significance. Paradoxically, its
application to morally dirty work also results in
lessened appeal. Therefore, our analysis focuses on a
narrower scope, namely socially dirty work.
Both morally and socially dirty work are tainted by
moral controversies, but two important aspects dif
ferentiate them: (a) the type of moral controversy that
affects them and (b) their social relevance. In morally
dirty work, the controversy affects the occupation
per se. Even if these morally debatable dirty jobs
operate legally (e.g., prostitution in Denmark), they
are inherently affected by a moral conflict that leads
some members of society to question whether they
should exist or argue that they are immoral and have
negative effects on the community. The lack of
common legislation and clashes with diverse com
munity groups reflect this intrinsic moral controversy
and ambiguity. The debate is not about the means
employed for its performance but rather about the
essence of the work. At the very least, it is question
able whether this work contributes to human dignity
and community welfare.
Socially dirty work is radically different. Nobody
questions the moral content of an occupation such as
an AIDS worker or police officer; their social
necessity and positive effects on the community
justify them absolutely. Nevertheless, these tasks and
their subjects can experience both moral contro
versies and stigmas, due to the means employed,
such as the use of drugs to assist psychiatric patients.
In these cases, workers’ moral imagination should be
especially relevant, because it influences decision
making processes and could help socially dirty
workers face the constant moral conflicts usually
5
referred to the means by which they conduct their
daily work. We explain this reasoning in the next
section. Overall though, the distinction among the
three types of dirty work leads us to limit our analysis
to socially dirty work and exclude physically and
morally dirty work.
Managing dirtiness with moral imagination
The potential positive effects of moral imagination
exercise on dirty work do not appear in prior business
ethics or organizational literature. Traditionally,
dirty work and the stigma associated with it have
been treated as psychological or social issues (Aviram
and Rosenfeld, 2002; Goffman, 1963). We instead
introduce a moral dimension to a problem that might
have ethical roots. That is, stigmas may be due to
ethically substantial reasons, such that overcoming
them could involve an ethical attitude, as provided by
moral imagination. The application of moral imagi
nation to stigmatized occupations implies positioning
the problem as an ethical issue and thus demands
ethical solutions.
An established personal and ethical attitude be
comes imperative to face moral dilemmas, because it
facilitates decision processes and consequently can
mitigate stigmas. We explore how moral imagina
tion might contribute to establish a personal ethical
attitude crucial for dirty workers.
What dirtiness?
However, why might the exercise of moral imagi
nation help dirty workers? Dirty workers consistently
face two types of moral conflicts in their work lives:
the constant moral dilemmas that emerge during
the course of their daily work, and initial conflict
that stigmatizes the occupation itself. Because moral
imagination supports complex moral decision
making processes, it might help socially dirty workers
make decisions that enable them to face moral con
flicts consistently.
Most dirty work entails repeated moral dilemmas
and issues, especially with regard to the methods
used to accomplish the work. Such conflicts (e.g.,
use of drugs, coercive force) repeatedly put the
worker in a difficult situation that demands a con
troversial decision. These conflict laden situations
may result from the stigmatized group with which
the dirty workers interact (e.g., mental illness suf
ferers, criminals). Furthermore, societal rejection can
be provoked by these groups and the controversies
associated with ways to manage them.
The stigma is thus associated with a moral con
troversy that makes certain occupations repulsive to
society and prompts people to seek distance from
them. The typology of these jobs forces workers to
confront situations infused with moral content but
that demand concrete decisions; therefore, the
workers need to adopt a personal stance toward these
decisions. Moral imagination can create such a moral
and personal stance, and the resultant coherent
decision making processes can facilitate job accep
tance, and rejection of the stigma.
Managing dirty occupations imaginatively
But how does moral imagination help dirty workers
deal with conflicts by facilitating decision processes?
Moral imagination shapes a personal moral attitude
toward different moral conflicts, which activates
personal moral decision making, and consequently
shapes a particular stance toward the job itself.
Specifically, moral imagination provides wider moral
awareness and reveals workers’ principles and values
to themselves.
Moral awareness in dirty conflicts
Moral imagination has been proven to be a powerful
mechanism in moral dilemmas and decision making
that bestows creative moral awareness on ethical
conflicts. In general, this faculty should provide
greater awareness, creativity, and critical ability to
make conscious, creative, and critical decisions. It
recognizes the moral content and repercussions of a
situation, which may not be evident. A broader
consciousness and sharp creativity should be more
relevant for work marked by moral and social con
troversies, because these occupations require con
scious decisions. The moral controversies that
surround socially dirty work often hinder percep
tions of the repercussions of decisions for the self,
others involved, and the community in general.
Because moral imagination activates deep sensitivity
to the feelings and perceptions of others, it can
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evoke more potential and complete scenarios and
perspectives. In general, moral imagination facilitates
morally complex decision making by offering wider
consciousness. Furthermore, the sorts of controver
sies that emerge from dirty jobs are always complex
but not always the same, so workers need creative,
imaginative, and personal responses, which imagi
nation can help provide.
The wider moral awareness provided by moral
imagination on moral dilemmas also applies to the
dirty worker’s perception of the job. The exercise of
moral imagination confers a better perception of the
moral and social content of a job and its effects on
the community. Moral imagination expands the
perspective on the occupation and its repercussions
for others and helps consolidate a personal position
toward it. For jobs whose performance may provoke
diverse interpretations, and constantly provokes ques
tions about its social or moral repercussions among
external groups, the effort to sharpen moral sensi
tivity becomes even more relevant as a means to
adopt an attitude that may come into conflict with
others’ positions. For example, people might view a
bill collector as a villain or a defender of law; in
either case, the bill collector must to be able to
identify these diverse perceptions prompted by his or
her occupation and the associated controversies, and
then build a personal perception of the job and its
performance. These cases demand creativity to
determine the level of dignity associated with the
work, which is not always easy. In particular, the
person must be able to disengage him or herself
from the dirt to visualize alternative views. Because
these occupations are not conventional, moral
imagination assists people in envisioning uncon
ventional possibilities. Moral imagination also helps
them disclose unconventional perceptions of their
stigmatized job and discover their own perspective,
coherent with their values.
Values and principles
One of the most relevant effects of moral imagina
tion in dirty tasks is its ability to illuminate the
worker’s moral values and principles, which supports
coherent decision making. In general, moral imag
ination helps dirty workers solve conflicts in a way
that is consistent with their values and hence build a
coherent attitude toward their job. A personal moral
attitude must be based on the person’s own values
and principles. Psychologists such as Festinger (1957)
similarly argue that people desire coherence in their
views, and Chaiken et al. (1996) assert that people
want all their attitudes and beliefs to be coherent
with their existing self definitional attitudes and
beliefs. However, if people are not always conscious
of their own values, recognizing them can be
arduous (Hartman, 2006), especially in complex
situations. Moral dilemmas and conflicts in the
workplace offer the possibility to undertake this
recognition task through the exercise of different
faculties, including moral imagination.
Specifically, moral imagination illuminates core
values and orients people toward decisions or posi
tions that are coherent with those values (Lan et al.,
2008). Thus, if a value that regulates a person’s life is
the rejection of the use of violence, that person
should avoid jobs that likely require violence, such as
law enforcement. However, the question goes
beyond mere ‘‘fitting’’ or ‘‘feeling comfortable.’’
That is, moral imagination discloses values, so people
can make coherent decisions and build an ethical and
personal attitude that contributes indirectly to
overcoming external stigma. By facilitating coherent
decision making processes, moral imagination might
help the worker achieve a more positive perception
of his or her work. In turn, the worker may feel
more comfortable with a conflict laden dirty job,
because its inherent moral conflicts can be addressed
from the position of personal values and wide moral
awareness, as provided by moral imagination. The
positive perception of the job results from solving
moral conflicts coherently with the person’s own
values.
In general, wider awareness and values disclosure,
as conferred by moral imagination, should facilitate
the solution of concrete moral dilemmas that arise
during work and hence improve the worker’s per
ception of the job itself.
Overcoming the stigma with others’ moral
imagination
However, perceptions of stigma and its impact on
self esteem do not affect only work groups. Exten
sive literature in sociology, psychology, and psy
chiatry identifies historical social stigmas and how
subgroups overcame them, in some cases in the form
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of social movements. Members of society have suf
fered social discrimination for a broad variety of
reasons, including mental illnesses and disorders
(Hinshaw, 2007; Kroska and Harkness, 2006), race
(Loury, 2003), religion (Khazzoom, 2003), sexual
preferences (Gentry, 1987), physical disabilities
(Friedman, 2004), or specific behaviors (Stuber
et al., 2008), to cite only a few. Gradually the per
sons affected by different stigmas and their families
form groups to combat, both individually and so
cially, their societal rejection. To a certain extent,
this progression also applies to our analysis; that is,
the formal and informal association of workers who
perform the same dirty work might offer a powerful
resource to mitigate the negative effects of stigmas,
both personally and for the group. Such groups
might form spontaneously within the organization in
which they work, but they usually emerge externally
and connect dirty workers who perform similar tasks
for different companies. There is thus a double effect
of these congregations, at individual and collective
levels.
The benefits of creating a group tend to be
understood in terms of the benefits derived from
group support. However, as an example of an
association of dirty workers, the American Psychi
atric Nurses Association serves to not only provide
comfort to individual dirty workers – by identifying
others with similar problems and sharing the expe
rience of stigma – but also acknowledge and address
the similar, morally complex situations that com
plicate their daily tasks. Therefore, contacts with
other members of the group might improve their
moral imagination and facilitate their moral decision
making. Through meetings with other members of
the group, an individual dirty worker gains the
opportunity to verbalize and share his or her experi
ences and conflicts, then discover how other workers
who have undergone similar moral conflicts in their
work lives face them. In these empathic meetings, the
individual moral imagination of a dirty worker likely
improves, through listening and observing how oth
ers have exercised their moral imagination in similar
circumstances. The close association among the
diverse dirty workers’ moral imaginations should also
improve workers’ moral sensitivity and strengthen the
moral abilities they need to address future ethical
ambiguities. Moreover, for members of a dirty work
group, the exchange of stories encourages them to
disclose their own values and reflect on how they feel
and think, such that they may define a clearer moral
stance. Through this process, the worker refines his or
her moral imagination by observing how other dirty
workers exercise theirs. The resulting coherent
decision making should generate relevant attitudinal
changes at work. In addition, empathic encounters
with other members of the same profession can help
an individual worker discover dimensions and im
pacts of his or her job that this person had previously
ignored.
Work takes place in the context of a social
structure that determines what evokes value. From
an active social perspective, members can benefit
from the strength of the group, because associations
act as social pressure groups that demand, through
the mediation of institutions, mitigation of the
negative attitudes and low consideration of wider
society. For example, dirty worker organizations
might demand subsidies for their meetings, engage in
campaigns to explain their contribution to society,
and attempt to transmit the problems that their
workers face. Such efforts and demands obviously
have more effect if they come from a consolidated
and organized group rather than from an individual.
Managing moral imagination
in organizations
If the exercise of moral imagination in the workplace
helps dirty workers face external stigma, it becomes
crucial to understand how organizations that include
dirty work groups can facilitate the exercise of their
employees’ moral imagination. How can organiza
tions create a work space in which workers’ moral
imagination can flourish? This question is important
not only for dirty work groups but also for compa
nies, especially those that integrate both dirty and
nondirty work groups, because problematic rela
tionships or isolation of dirty workers can affect
company performance.
In business ethics and psychology, several scholars
have attempted to identify factors that induce people
to engage in moral imagination (Caldwell and
Moberg, 2006; Johnson, 1993; Vidaver Cohen,
1997). Our discussion centers not on the individual
moral characteristics of decision makers (Aquino and
Reed, 2002, 2003) but rather on the institutional
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factors and practices that encourage people’s moral
imagination. We therefore investigate how organi
zations might create the conditions that inspire
moral imagination by noting the importance of
organizational culture for enhancing workers’ moral
sensitivity. Furthermore, in this section we analyze
different company practices that may derive from a
culture committed to moral imagination.
Organizational cultures: ethics and community
Extensive evidence in social research indicates that
organizational culture has a powerful influence on
people’s behavior (O’Reilly et al., 1991; Trevin˜o
and Weaver, 2001), in that people tend to adapt to
their culture’s core values. Organizational cultures
influence thoughts and feelings, as well as guide
behaviors and decisions. We identify two elements
often prioritized by organizational cultures aligned
with members’ moral imagination: ethics and com
munity.
Significant evidence also reveals that organizations
can support or oppose ethical behavior. Some studies
note correlations between ethical organizational
cultures and ethical individual behaviors (Trevin˜o,
1986; Trevin˜o et al., 1998), as well as an influence of
corporate cultures on ethical decision making
(Nwachukwu and Vitell, 1997). For example, Chen
et al. (1997) argue that ethical behavior depends on
employees’ ability to recognize ethical issues, which
is a function of corporate culture. Caldwell and
Moberg (2006) similarly posit that organizations
with an organizational culture that prioritizes ethics
over other factors will be committed to enhancing
their workers’ moral imagination. Organizational
cultures aligned with moral imagination do not
attempt to promote a specific ethical value over
another but instead encourage critical thinking by
organizational members, inspired by their own
values, to detect, understand, and prioritize ethical
issues. This means that the company exhibits strong
commitment to the particularity of the individual
worker’s values. Companies with dirty work groups
should attempt to promulgate an organizational
culture that is especially attentive to ethical themes
and prioritize respect for critical thinking among
workers. As we have explained, moral imagination
acquires special relevance in such jobs.
Moberg and Seabright (2000) instead focus on a
sense of community as a particular characteristic of
moral imagination based cultures. Such organiza
tional cultures strengthen community values and
reinforce two fundamental aspects of moral imagi
nation for dirty work groups: moral inclusion
(Opotow, 1990) and the empathic processes involved
in taking others’ perspectives. Companies that
include dirty work groups might try to avoid their
isolation by promoting moral inclusion and encour
aging perspective taking through direct contacts
across their various work groups. By acquiring
knowledge of others’ perspectives, nonmarginalized
groups and workers should grow to appreciate their
feelings and concerns and recognize their contribu
tion to the firm’s global objectives. Direct contacts
across work groups in the same company also may
reveal the importance and contribution of the dirty
work to the other functions. For example, a hospital
might encourage doctors to realize the contribution
of the cleaning staff to their ability to perform their
jobs and to the efficient operations of the organization
in general (Dutton et al., 1996). As we have noted,
these empathic processes are more effective if
undertaken through the exercise of moral imagina
tion. By appreciating others’ perspectives, a person
should become more empathic toward stigmatized
groups (Sheehan et al., 1989). Specifically, an imag
inative assumption of the place of the dirty worker,
who could be desperate for work or feeling displaced,
questioned, or rejected, might mitigate the initial
negative impression produced. Furthermore, being
able to imagine what it is like to be stigmatized should
lead the person to recognize the complexity of his or
her situation. However, such empathy often requires
nurturing of the capacity to imagine what it feels like
to be a person marked by a social stigma. Organiza
tions therefore might create means by which their
members come into constant contact with dirty
workers to encourage these empathic processes.
Narratives
Companies can use narratives as part of their culture
to trigger the inclusive and empathic behaviors de
scribed above. The use of narratives is coherent with
an organizational culture attentive to community
values and ethical themes. Meetings, narratives, and
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symbols provide symbolic practices that signify
common roots and enhance the exercise of workers’
moral imagination. The value of narratives in
organizations has been explored previously (Coles,
1987, 1989; McAdams and Koppensteiner, 2004;
McGregor and Holmes, 1999; Pardales, 2002). As
these scholars show, the use of narratives generates
greater awareness of the complexity of the person’s
own and others’ moral conflicts, and activates deeper
sensitivity to the feelings and perceptions of others.
Narratives also broaden the intellectual space for a
dialog among perspectives, players, and moral con
flicts during ethical decision making processes or
moral dilemmas. To establish a personal moral
stance, people need both knowledge and imagina
tion, as well as a recognition of the effects of their
actions on others. Finally, people must be able to
vividly imagine themselves in others’ places. Narra
tives offer a compelling method to achieve these
requirements by improving workers’ moral sensi
tivity and strengthening the moral abilities they need
to address ethical ambiguities. For members of a
dirty work group, stories encourage them to think
about what they want and believe, as well as to
disclose their values. Moreover, imagination can
provide the ability to construct positive symbolism
and narratives that make dirty occupations more
bearable. For those in contact with a dirty work
group, narratives help enliven the empathic pro
cesses.
Job design
In recent decades, research on job design has
generated various insights into the factors that influ
ence employees’ responses to their jobs (Brosseau,
1985: Hackman and Oldman, 1980). We emphasize
nonfragmentation and autonomy as two important
variables that relate directly to the exercise of moral
imagination. Because the design of a task determines
its level of autonomy and responsibility, as well as its
connection to tasks carried out by others, job design
determines the possibility of exercising moral imagi
nation in the workplace.
In a comparison of union and nonunion electri
cians, for example, Murphy (1993) shows that
occupational design might provide space for work
ers’ moral imagination – or not. Murphy particularly
emphasizes the effects of the division of labor, which
can limit the possibilities for exercising moral imagi
nation in the workplace. Ruskin (2008) also cites the
division of labor as a main cause of job unhappiness,
and Bach et al. (2007) explain that shifts in the divi
sion of labor can lead to empowerment or degrada
tion in workplace roles. An extremely fragmented job
seems monotonous and stifles the human capacity for
thought and imagination. It also favors labor and
social disconnection and leads to isolation and moral
exclusion from other groups. In general, highly
fragmented jobs do not allow for the exercise of moral
imagination, because the worker cannot perceive his
or her contribution and personal responsibility.
Autonomy in carrying out a task, facing moral
dilemmas, and making decisions is thus a prerequisite
for the development of moral imagination in the
workplace. The exercise of moral imagination also
requires a job design that makes workers responsible
for their outcomes and enables them to identify
and evaluate their individual contributions to the
collective.
In the specific case of dirty occupations, a lack of
fragmentation and autonomy takes on even more
relevance. The possibility of developing creative
awareness becomes crucial, both to understand the
dimensions and contributions of dirty work groups
with which you interact and to be conscious of the
relevance and involvement of one’s own dirty
occupation, in a more global context.
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